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The affirmative’s claims to how China will act and react to certain policies like the plan depends on a rationalization of China – this flawed positivist epistemology seeks to render all of the international arena knowable and predictable – the result is the inevitable emergence of a ‘China threat’ based on orientalization

**Pan 4** – prof school of international and political studies, Deakin U. PhD in pol sci and IR, (Chengxin, “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics,” 1 June 2004, http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/northern-asia-china/796470-1.html)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist, ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo)realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo)realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other," (45) and "All other states are potential threats." (46) In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other." (47) The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost **by default, China emerges** **as** an absolute other and **a threat** thanks to this (neo)realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy." (50) And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." (51) Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" (52) Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger. (53) In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely.... Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences.... U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. (54) The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China," (55) argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)." (56) It is mainly on the basis of this self-fashioning that many U.S. scholars have for long claimed their "expertise" on China. For example, from his observation (presumably on Western TV networks) of the Chinese protest against the U.S. bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Robert Kagan is confident enough to speak on behalf of the whole Chinese people, claiming that he knows "the fact" of "what [China] really thinks about the United States." That is, "they consider the United States an enemy--or, more precisely, the enemy.... How else can one interpret the Chinese government's response to the bombing?" he asks, rhetorically. (57) For Kagan, because the Chinese "have no other information" than their government's propaganda, the protesters cannot rationally "know" the whole event as "we" do. Thus, their anger must have been orchestrated, unreal, and hence need not be taken seriously. (58) Given that Kagan heads the U.S. Leadership Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is very much at the heart of redefining the United States as the benevolent global hegemon, his confidence in speaking for the Chinese "other" is perhaps not surprising. In a similar vein, without producing in-depth analysis, Bernstein and Munro invoke with great ease such all-encompassing notions as "the Chinese tradition" and its "entire three-thousand-year history." (59) In particular, they repeatedly speak of what China's "real" goal is: "China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia.... China aims at achieving a kind of hegemony.... China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy." (60) Likewise, with the goal of absolute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the [island](http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/northern-asia-china/796470-1.html).... This is true because of geography; because of America's reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China's capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense. (61) By now, it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," **a discursive construct from which it cannot escape**. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security concerns in the current debate." (62) At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. (63) "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, **strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient**. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] **'they' become 'they' accordingly**." (64) It may be the case that there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China (65) or to recognize that China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it. (66) Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them" are always closely linked to how "we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm. This is exactly how the discursive strategy of perceiving China as a threatening other should be understood, a point addressed in the following section, which explores some of the practical dimension of this discursive strategy in the containment perspectives and hegemonic ambitions of U.S. foreign policy.

Discourse of Chinese aggression is a neoliberal ploy masking the paranoiac fear of the decline of dollar hegemony – their discourse becomes a justification for further militarism and aggression

Cunningham 12/1 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 12-1-13, “Dollar survival behind US-China tensions,” <http://nsnbc.me/2013/12/01/dollar-survival-behind-us-china-tensions/>) gz

The escalation of military tensions between Washington and Beijing in the East China Sea is superficially over China’s unilateral declaration of an air defense zone. But the real reason for Washington’s ire is the recent Chinese announcement that it is planning to reduce its holdings of the US dollar.¶ That move to offload some of its 3.5 trillion in US dollar reserves combined with China’s increasing global trade in oil based on national currencies presents a mortal threat to the American petrodollar and the entire American economy.¶ This threat to US viability – already teetering on bankruptcy, record debt and social meltdown – would explain why Washington has responded with such belligerence to China setting up an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) last week extending some 400 miles from its coast into the East China Sea.¶ ¶ Beijing said the zone was aimed at halting intrusive military maneuvers by US spy planes over its territory. The US has been conducting military flights over Chinese territory for decades without giving Beijing the slightest notification.¶ ¶ Back in April 2001, a Chinese fighter pilot was killed when his aircraft collided with a US spy plane. The American crew survived, but the incident sparked a diplomatic furor, with Beijing saying that it illustrated Washington’s unlawful and systematic violation of Chinese sovereignty.¶ Within days of China’s announcement of its new ADIZ last week, the US sent two B52 bombers into the air space without giving the notification of flight paths required by Beijing.¶ ¶ American allies Japan and South Korea also sent military aircraft in defiance of China. Washington dismissed the Chinese declared zone and asserted that the area was international air space.¶ A second intrusion of China’s claimed air territory involved US surveillance planes and up to 10 Japanese American-made F-15 fighter jets. On that occasion, Beijing has responded more forcefully by scrambling SU-30 and J-10 warplanes, which tailed the offending foreign aircraft.¶ Many analysts see the latest tensions as part of the ongoing dispute between China and Japan over the islands known, respectively, as the Diaoyu and Senkaku, located in the East China Sea. Both countries claim ownership. The islands are uninhabited but the surrounding sea is a rich fishing ground and the seabed is believed to contain huge reserves of oil and gas.¶ By claiming the skies over the islands, China appears to be adding to its territorial rights to the contested islands.¶ In a provocative warning to Beijing, American defense secretary Chuck Hagel this week reiterated that the decades-old US-Japan military pact covers any infringement by China of Japan’s claim on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.¶ It is hard to justify Washington and Tokyo’s stance on the issue. The islands are much nearer to China’s mainland (250 miles) compared with Japan’s (600 miles). China claims that the islands were part of its territory for centuries until Japan annexed them in 1895 during its imperialist expansion, which eventually led to an all-out invasion and war of aggression on China.¶ Also, as Beijing points out, the US and its postwar Japanese ally both have declared their own air defense zones. It is indeed inconceivable that Chinese spy planes and bombers could encroach unannounced on the US West Coast without the Pentagon ordering fierce retaliation.¶ Furthermore, maps show that the American-backed air defense zone extending from Japan’s southern territory is way beyond any reasonable halfway limit between China and Japan. This American-backed arbitrary imposition on Chinese territorial sovereignty is thus seen as an arrogant convention, set up and maintained by Washington for decades.¶ The US and its controlled news media are absurdly presenting Beijing’s newly declared air defense zone as China “flexing its muscles and stoking tensions.” And Washington is claiming that it is nobly defending its Japanese and South Korea allies from Chinese expansionism.¶ However, it is the background move by China to ditch the US dollar that is most likely the real cause for Washington’s militarism towards Beijing. The apparent row over the air and sea territory, which China has sound rights to, is but the pretext for the US to mobilize its military and in effect threaten China with aggression.¶ In recent years, China has been incrementally moving away from US financial hegemony. This hegemony is predicated on the US dollar being the world reserve currency and, by convention, the standard means of payment for international trade and in particular trade in oil. That arrangement is obsolete given the bankrupt state of the US economy. But it allows the US to continue bingeing on credit.¶ China – the second biggest economy in the world and a top importer of oil – has or is seeking oil trading arrangements with its major suppliers, including Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela, which will involve the exchange of national currencies. That development presents a grave threat to the petrodollar and its global reserve status.¶ The latest move by Beijing on November 20 giving notice that it intends to shift its risky foreign exchange holdings of US Treasury notes for a mixture of other currencies is a harbinger that the¶ American economy’s days are numbered, as Paul Craig Roberts noted last week.¶ ¶ This is of course China’s lawful right to do so, as are its territorial claims. But, in the imperialist, megalomaniac mindset of Washington, the “threat” to the US economy and indebted way of life is perceived as a tacit act of war. That is why Washington is reacting so furiously and desperately to China’s newly declared air corridor. It is a pretext for the US to clench an iron fist.

This drive for ontological certainty causes endless violence

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

**Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing the contradictions of imperial knowledge production – this dissident act fractures hegemonic thought**

**Spanos, 8** (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30)

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective¶ of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its¶ poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance¶ either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he¶ influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation¶ of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must,¶ rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving¶ a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism¶ of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political¶ Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his¶ or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics¶ capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental¶ political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant,¶ the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities;¶ they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the¶ same world-historical event.¶ The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum¶ “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse¶ of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive¶ systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent¶ to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can¶ be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of¶ liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any¶ rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different,¶ “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific¶ politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics¶ of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure¶ of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented¶ discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its¶ critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing¶ the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege¶ it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues,¶ in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling—¶ disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory¶ logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical¶ logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project¶ proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that¶ being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though¶ unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses¶ its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological¶ subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender,¶ and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or¶ global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory¶ political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized)¶ by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary¶ representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do¶ not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference”¶ (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the¶ differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible”¶ or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt¶ “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah”¶ (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus¶ in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha),¶ “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben),¶ “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and¶ Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international¶ post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern”¶ black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily¶ to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics:¶ The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to¶ explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because¶ they appear almost always in conjunction with representations¶ of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or¶ under complete control, these images of blinding whiteness seem¶ to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is¶ the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence¶ that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear¶ and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature¶ seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex¶ and contradictory situation in which American writers found¶ themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38¶ In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of¶ the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think¶ the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to¶ know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking¶ the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven¶ relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold¶ War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and¶ operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that¶ ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s¶ perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible¶ as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary¶ problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented¶ discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance¶ with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological¶ and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present¶ uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established¶ by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture,¶ I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming¶ the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of¶ the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the¶ post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according¶ to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives¶ that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne¶ apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy¶ and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested,¶ will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity¶ constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a¶ continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical¶ Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary¶ (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment¶ liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also¶ show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would¶ obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring¶ to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post-¶ Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced¶ the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the¶ adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized)¶ the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian¶ thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories¶ to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently¶ administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

Every affirmation is a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – neutralizing that moment before a decision is in and of itself violent

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

### Environment

No risk of a spill – safety coop now, emergency authority and there is so little recoverable oil there won’t be much drilling

Cardenas, 12 – former senior official at the U.S. State Department (Jose, “The phony Cuba embargo debate”, Foreign Policy, March 21, 2012, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/21/the\_phony\_cuba\_embargo\_debate)//eek

In recent weeks, an unholy alliance of political activists and economic opportunists have been trying to convince anyone who will listen that the U.S. embargo of Cuba is inviting "catastrophic" damage to Florida by preventing the U.S. from responding to a potential oil spill from a newly launched Cuban rig just outside U.S. waters. The claim is without merit. The impetus for this contrived argument is that in late January, the Spanish oil company Repsol began exploratory drilling in Cuban waters -- 80 nautical miles from the Florida Keys -- using a Chinese-made rig owned by an Italian company. The fact is, under current U.S. policy, any U.S. President has broad authorities to ensure all U.S. resources and expertise can be deployed in case of a disaster off the southeastern U.S. coast. And all indications are the administration has moved expeditiously -- with lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico -- to plan a U.S. response -- with no changes needed in U.S. law. Yet, that has not stopped the doomsday scenarios. For example, according to one alarmist analysis, in case of an accident: "The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S. offshore gas and oil companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and other vital technologies." The arguments, frankly, are a hash of half-truths and erroneous and contradictory statements about the U.S. embargo. For example, we are told the U.S. embargo prevents interaction between the U.S. and Cuban officials to discuss response scenarios, only to learn that they already are interacting. Meetings between U.S. and Cuban officials (and those from Bahamas, Jamaica, and Mexico) have already taken place under the auspices of the U.N. International Maritime Organization. Then there is the ludicrous scenario posited of vintage Cuban crop dusters being forced into action because the embargo allegedly would prevent U.S. aircraft from dropping oil dispersants. Nonsense. In addition, there is the de rigueur clumsy caricature of pro-embargo Cuban Americans, who "might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory." This seems not to be aware that most Cuban Americans live in South Florida and would have a decided interest in any despoiling of the state's environment. They would hardly be averse to any U.S. mobilization to counter a spill. What they do justifiably object to is any exploitation of the situation for political ends. Indeed, a particularly egregious example of the politicization of the issue has been the involvement of the Environmental Defense Fund, which has been positively sanguine about Cuban oil drilling. A powerful lobby able to mobilize hundreds of activists to oppose U.S. offshore drilling, they have been leading advocates of across-the-board U.S. cooperation with Cuba on offshore oil drilling, despite the latter's woeful inexperience and dearth of capabilities in offshore oil drilling. In this, they have been aided and abetted by assorted U.S. oil services companies who have been misrepresenting U.S. policy in a misguided attempt to create economic opportunity. In the end, the likelihood that Cuba possesses any commercially viable oil reserves off its shores is dubious. And, in the unlikely event that it does discover any, it's probable that they will be exploitable only after the Castro regime passes into the dustbin of history. In the meantime, however, allowing Cuba anywhere near a deepwater platform is akin to handing a hand-grenade to a monkey. The Obama administration could have done better by strong-arming foreign companies from partnering with the Castro brothers on this project. But they appear to have a handle on cleaning up any attendant mess -- without any superfluous changes to U.S. policy towards the Castro dictatorship.

Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case

Buell 3 (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse** thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “**total solution**” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “**final solution**.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into **inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “**total solution**.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism** was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

### Relations

Cuba won’t pursue an alliance with the U.S. – anti-Americanism outweighs

Suchlicki 13 (Jaime Suchlicki, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, “Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/> 3-4-13)

Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere.¶ Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.¶ Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba.¶ Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies.**¶** The issue between Cuba and the U.S. is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction - for the United States to change it policies.

Zero chance of Taiwan war --- China’s cooperating with them --- most recent evidence

Jiao and Wanli, 10/6

Wu Jiao and Yang Wanli, reporters for China Daily, citing Ni Yongjie, deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of Taiwan Studies, AND Wang Yingjin, professor at the School of International Studies of Renmin University of China, AND Vincent Siew, honourary chairman of the Taiwan-based Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation, AND Zhang Zhijun, the mainland’s Taiwan affairs top official, AND Xi Jinping, current leader of China; “Direction charted to resolve disputes,” 10/6/2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-10/06/content\_17011582.htm //bghs-ms

Political disputes between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan could be gradually and eventually resolved, Party chief Xi Jinping said on Sunday.¶ He made the remarks while meeting Vincent Siew, honourary chairman of the Taiwan-based Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation, ahead of the 21st informal economic leaders’ meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum on the Indonesian resort island of Bali.¶ "We cannot hand those problems down from generation to generation," Xi said.¶ The concept that "both sides of the Straits are of one family" should be advocated, Xi said, adding that the two sides should strengthen communication and cooperation and jointly work for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.¶ During the 40-minute meeting, Xi said that it is important for the mainland and Taiwan to seize the historic opportunities to keep up the good momentum of the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.¶ Xi noted that enhancing cross-Straits political trust and consolidating a common political basis are "crucial" to ensuring peaceful development of cross-Straits ties.¶ "We should set our sights on the future," Xi said.¶ He advised that the principals of departments-in-charge from the two sides may meet and exchange ideas for cross-Straits affairs.¶ Siew hailed the development of cross-Straits relations over the past five years, saying Taiwan and the mainland should expand economic and trade cooperation.¶ It was the second meeting between the two since March. Their first meeting took place on the sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia held in Hainan province in April.¶ **Experts** said they believe the talks between Xi and Siew were a positive sign for both sides to strengthen trade ties, which will pave the way for deepening political and cultural exchanges.¶ "As a representative of (Taiwan leader) Ma Ying-jeou, Siew, to some extent, conveys messages from Ma. **The talks will lay a good foundation to solve differences between the two** sides," said Ni Yongjie, deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of Taiwan Studies.¶ "Xi’s words on solving problems that exist between the two sides, step by step, show hope that the two sides could reach a consensus on certain issues soon," Ni said.¶ Siew, a former Taiwan senior official, has participated in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum twice since the 1990s. He was nicknamed by Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s "chief economic designer" due to his strategic thoughts on trade and business.¶ Wang Yingjin, professor at the School of International Studies of Renmin University of China, said that Siew’s experience on business and politics will contribute to further economic cooperation between the two sides.¶ "The concept of a co-market of the mainland and Taiwan was proposed by Siew. He is a good delegate to talk with the mainland on business," he said.¶ Although not all problems could be solved overnight, he said, the two sides should not avoid facing them. "Working together to tackle the problems is the right way."¶ Shortly after the meeting, Zhang Zhijun, the mainland’s Taiwan affairs top official, chatted with Wang Yu-chi, Taiwan’s official in charge of mainland affairs. Both participated in Xi’s meeting with Siew.¶ Wang proposed that they should realise mutual visits, which Zhang agreed to, according to a press release by the mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office.¶ Zhang said he welcomed Wang visiting the mainland "at the proper time".¶ According to a cross-Straits service trade agreement that was signed in June, the Chinese mainland will open 80 service sectors to Taiwan, while, in response, Taiwan will open 64 sectors.¶ It is one of several follow-up agreements to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, a comprehensive cross-Straits economic pact signed in 2010.¶ Experts said that the two sides could deepen exchanges in wholesaling, retailing, finance, telecommunications and healthcare, as the mainland moves to upgrade its economy.¶ According to the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, cross-Straits trade reached a historic high of US$168.96 billion in 2012, and the mainland’s investment in Taiwan increased 10-fold compared with 2011.¶ In 2012, more than 2,000 projects, with a total investment of $2.8 billion from Taiwan, were permitted to operate in the mainland.

**No nuclear escalation and outside powers will stay out**

**Cliff & Shlapak, 7** – Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. Shlapak, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 2007

This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

**No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant**

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

The presumption of exclusive non-state terror that can be objectively studied is suspect – it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy constructed through speech and accumulation of data

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As explained earlier, a ﬁrst order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and employing the same social scientiﬁc modes of analysis, terminology, and empirical and analytical categories employed within terrorism studies, as well as many of its own texts and authors, it can be argued that virtually all the narratives and assumptions described in the previous section are contestable and subject to doubt. There is not the space here to provide counterevidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider discourse; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them elsewhere (see Jackson, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). It must instead sufﬁce to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge’ is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, ‘new terrorism’, and counterterrorism narratives. In the ﬁrst instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instill terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial deﬁnition within the ﬁeld and wider society – then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson, 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic states during the colonial period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and proinsurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup, 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002; Klare, 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002). The assumption that terrorism can be objectively deﬁned and studied is also highly questionable and far more complex than this. It can be argued that terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identiﬁed in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the ﬁrst instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through an identiﬁable set of discursive practices – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security ofﬁcials, and the codiﬁcation of certain actions in law – which thus make it a contingent ‘reality’ for politicians, law enforcement ofﬁcials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the deﬁnitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies ﬁeld. Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-exaggerated (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004). More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, speciﬁcally, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key ﬁndings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s ﬁndings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005). Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efﬁcacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006). In sum, much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review of the ﬁeld, Andrew Silke has described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the ﬁrst order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and ﬁnal ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, ﬁrst order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the ﬁeld, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and to pursue alternative intellectual and political projects.

### Oil

**Economic threat predictions will cause the US to manipulate regimes in a non-democratic fashion---link turns the whole case and empirically kills millions**

**Neocleous, 8** Prof of Gov[Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, *Critique of Security*, p95-]

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual con sistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped **co-opt the liberal Left into the process** and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole worldbecame a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of **intervention and policing all over the globe**. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capitalaccumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an **ambitious and frequently violent strategy.** Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the **‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence**. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co- opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the **slaughter of untold numbers**. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of **six million people killed – and this is a minimum** ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111

**No impact to the economy**

**Barnett, 9** (Thomas P.M., senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine) August 2009“The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis” http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

## 2NC

### framework

situated position underpins political efficacy

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

**Moreover, representations and the affective field of images are the basis and motivation for war. What we lack is not a proper scientific or empirical challenge to violence; we lack the cultural critics willing to fight the fear mongering which results in war. The AFF’s discourse is enmeshed in a form of affective securitization that makes war inevitable. As scholars, we have an obligation to refuse and problematize the cultural grammar of security.**

**Elliott 2012**

/Emory, University Professor of the University of California and Distinguished Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside Terror, Theory, and the Humanities ed. Di Leo, Open Humanities Press, Online/

In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo expressed his views on the place of literature in our times in a statement that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his novel Mao II: In a repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society that’s ﬁlled with glut and endless consumption, the act of terror may be the only meaningful act. People who are in power make their arrangements in secret, largely as a way of maintaining and furthering that power. People who are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a vision. There is a deep narrative structure to terrorist acts, and they infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers used to aspire to. (qtd. in DePietro 84) The implications of DeLillo’s statement are that we are all engaged in national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts of representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere. In the early days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power of images, such as those of the “mother of all bombs” and a wide array of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to influence and shape the consciousness of millions and to generate strong support for the war. The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those days after 9/11 have enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military agenda that it had planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruction, scandals and illegalities, and domestic and international demonstrations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction of this agenda. Those of us in the humanities who are trained as critical readers of political and social texts, as well as of complex artistically constructed texts, are needed now more urgently than ever to analyze the relationships between political power and the wide range of rhetorical methods being employed by politicians and others to further their destructive effects in the world. If humanities scholars can create conscious awareness of how such aesthetic devices such as we see in those photos achieve their **affective appeal**, citizens may begin to understand how they are being manipulated and motivated by emotion rather than by reason and logic. In spite of our ability to expose some of these verbal and visual constructions as devices of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable discussion, we humanities scholars find ourselves marginalized and on the defensive in our institutions of higher learning where our numbers have been diminished and where we are frequently being asked to justify the significance of our research and teaching. While we know the basic truth that the most serious threats to our societies today are more likely to result from cultural differences and failures of communication than from inadequate scientific information or technological inadequacies, we have been given no voice in this debate. With the strong tendency toward polarized thinking and opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist religious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world, leaders continue to abandon diplomacy and resort to military actions. Most government leaders find the cultural and social explanations of the problems we face to be vague, and they are frustrated by complex human issues. That is not reason enough, however, for us to abandon our efforts to influence and perhaps even alter the current course of events. In spite of the discouragements that we as scholars of the humanities are experiencing in these times, it seems to me that we have no option but to continue to pursue our research and our teaching and hope to influence others to question

4) ceding imagination to the state effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – choose to confront your role in violence

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### t/enviro

their politics is guilt assuaging which ignores personal complicity in environmental crisis

Bobertz, 95 (Bradley, Nebraska Law, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 711)

A routine pattern in environmental lawmaking is a tendency to blame environmental problems on easily identifiable objects or entities rather than on the social and economic practices that actually produce them. [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n17) Once identified as the culprit of an environmental problem, this blame-holder comes to symbolize and embody the problem itself. Lawmaking then begins to resemble a re-enactment of a scapegoat ritual, in which the community's misfortunes are symbolically transferred to an entity that is then banished or slain in order to cleanse the community of its collective wrongdoing and remove the source of its adversity. The topic of scapegoating is commonly encountered in studies of racism, n18 family psychology, [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n19) and mass sociology, n20 but is not often associated with law and legal scholarship. Nevertheless, parallels appear to exist between the general scapegoat phenomenon and environmental lawmaking.The term "scapegoat" derives from the guilt offerings ceremony set forth in the biblical book of Leviticus. According to the Levitical  [\*717]  scapegoat ceremony, Aaron placed both hands on the head of a live goat and confessed the sins of the people of Israel. [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n21) Having thereby transferred the collective guilt of the people to the goat, he drove the goat into the desert "to carry off their iniquities to an isolated region." n22 This ceremony was to be repeated each year on the Day of Atonement. Other sacrifice rituals, including the "sin offering for the community" [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n23) and the "guilt offerings," n24 were to be performed on a periodic basis. Essentially identical, [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n25) these other ceremonies involve the slaying of a young bull as a means for forgiving inadvertent transgressions of the people. n26Other cultures also employ similar sacrifice rituals to expunge evils brought about by the collective misconduct of the community. Beginning with James Frazer's The Golden Bough, [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n27) anthropologists have catalogued a remarkable variety of sacrifice rituals intended to expel collective sin. n28 Despite subtle variations in form and emphasis, these ceremonies follow a remarkably similar pattern: the participants view the ritual as a necessary measure for expelling collective wrongdoing, often after some misfortune or calamity has befallen the community. [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n29) Often, both the transference of the community's sins to the scapegoat object and the sacrifice of the object itself are performed by persons having special standing in the community, typically of a religious character. n30 [\*718]  While we might view these sacrifice rituals as acts of merely symbolic import, the participants themselves clearly believe the ceremonies accomplish their desired ends. The people of Southern Africa do not place the blood of their sick people on the head of a goat (which is then banished to the veldt) to engage the curiosity of European anthropologists. They simply intend to make sick people well. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n31) Likewise, the people put to death in Salem were killed because they were thought (proven!) to be witches, not because they were personifications of some other social anxiety. n32 To the detached observer, the bizarre and gruesome aspects of the ceremonies may stand out, but the participants do what they do because they believe it will work. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n33)This Article is not intended to support the notion that the targets of environmental regulation, in one way or another, are "scapegoats" in the common understanding of the term -- deserving of pity and freedom from compliance with environmental laws. Instead, I intend to shed light on a simple but troubling pattern: Environmental legislation is more likely to emerge from the lawmaking process when the problem it seeks to control is readily symbolized by an identifiable object, entity, or person -- a "scapegoat" in the sense discussed above. In the absence of such a scapegoat, however, lawmakers are less likely to take action. This pattern is particularly problematic because the identified scapegoat often bears an incomplete or distorted relationship to the actual problem at hand, resulting in laws that are likewise incomplete or distorted. As discussed below in Part V, because we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols of environmental problems, it is less likely that we will deal with the problems (and their causes) themselves. For anyone concerned about the correlation between social problems and the legal regimes we create to solve them, this phenomenon should be cause for concern.

### Rey Chow 06

**Orientalist academia is incredibly dangerous—debate will continue to produce war-inspired knowledge that makes violence and war inevitable**

**Chow 06** (Rey Chow – Andrew W. Mellon professor of the humanities at Brown, 2006, “The Age of the World Target”, pg. 38-41)

In the decades since 1945, whether in dealing with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and countries in Central America, or during the Gulf Wars, the United States has been conducting war on the basis of a certain kind of knowledge production, and producing knowledge on the basis of war. War and knowledge enable and foster each other primarily through the collective fantasizing of some foreign or alien body that poses danger to the "self" and the "eye" that is the nation. Once the monstrosity of this foreign body is firmly established in the national consciousness, the decision makers of the U.S. government often talk and behave as though they had no choice but war.38 War, then, is acted out as a moral obligation to expel an imagined dangerous alienness from the United States' self-concept as the global custodian of freedom and democracy. Put in a different way, the "moral element," insofar as it produces knowledge about the "self" and "other"—and hence the "eye" and its "target"—as such, justifies war by its very dichotomizing logic. Conversely, the violence of war, once begun, fixes the other in its attributed monstrosity and affirms the idealized image of the self. In this regard, the pernicious stereotyping of the Japanese during the Second World War—not only by U.S. military personnel but also by social and behavioral scientists—was simply a flagrant example of an ongoing ideological mechanism that had accompanied Western treatments of non-Western "others" for centuries. In the hands of academics such as Geoffrey Gorer, writes Dower, the notion that was collectively and "objectively" formed about the Japanese was that they were "a clinically compulsive and probably collectively neurotic people, whose lives were governed by ritual and 'situational ethics,' wracked with insecurity, and swollen with deep, dark currents of repressed resentment and aggression."39 As Dower points out, such stereotyping was by no means accidental or unprecedented: The Japanese, so "unique" in the rhetoric of World War Two, were actually saddled with racial stereotypes that Europeans and Americans had applied to nonwhites for centuries: during the conquest of the New World, the slave trade, the Indian wars in the United States, the agitation against Chinese immigrants in America, the colonization of Asia and Africa, the U.S. conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century. These were stereotypes, moreover, which had been strongly reinforced by nineteenth-century Western science. In the final analysis, in fact, these favored idioms denoting superiority and inferiority transcended race and represented formulaic expressions of Self and Other in general."' The moralistic divide between "self" and "other" constitutes the production of knowledge during the U.S. Occupation of Japan after the Second World War as well. As Monica Braw writes, in the years immediately after 1945, the risk that the United States would be regarded as barbaric and inhumane was carefully monitored, in the main by cutting off Japan from the rest of the world through the ban on travel, control of private mail, and censorship of research, mass media information, and other kinds of communication. The entire Occupation policy was permeated by the view that "the United States was not to be accused; guilt was only for Japan":41 As the Occupation of Japan started, the atmosphere was military. Japan was a defeated enemy that must be subdued. The Japanese should be taught their place in the world: as a defeated nation, Japan had no status and was entitled to no respect. People should be made to realize that any catastrophe that had befallen them was of their own making. Until they had repented, they were suspect. If they wanted to release information about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it could only be for the wrong rea-sons, such as accusing the United States of inhumanity. Thus this informa-tion was suppressed.42 As in the scenario of aerial bombing, the elitist and aggressive panoramic "vision" in which the other is beheld means that the sufferings of the other matter much less than the transcendent aspirations of the self. And, despite being the products of a particular culture's technological fanaticism, such transcendent aspirations are typically expressed in the form of selfless uni-versalisms. As Sherry puts it, "The reality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed less important than the bomb's effect on 'mankind's destiny,' on 'humanity's choice,' on 'what is happening to men's minds,' and on hopes (now often extravagantly revived) to achieve world government."'" On Ja-pan's side, as Yoneyama writes, such a "global narrative of the universal history of humanity" has helped sustain "**a national victimology** and phantasm of innocence throughout most of the postwar years." Going one step further, she remarks: "The idea that Hiroshima's disaster ought to be remembered from the transcendent and anonymous position of humanity .. . .might best be described as 'nuclear universalism.' "44 Once the relations among war, racism, and knowledge production are underlined in these terms, it is no longer possible to assume, as some still do, that the recognizable features of modern war—its impersonality, coerciveness, and deliberate cruelty—are "divergences" from the "antipathy" to violence and to conflict that characterize the modern world.45 Instead, it would be incumbent on us to realize that the pursuit of war— with its use of violence—and the pursuit of peace—with its cultivation of knowledge—are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, the coin that I have been calling "the age of the world target." Rather than being irreconcilable opposites, war and peace are coexisting, collaborative functions in the continuum of a virtualized world. More crucially still, only the privileged nations of the world can afford to wage war and preach peace at one and the same time. As Sherry writes, "The United States had different resources with which to be fanatical: resources allowing it to take the lives of others more than its own, ones whose accompanying rhetoric of technique disguised the will to destroy."45 From this it follows that, if indeed political and military acts of cruelty are not unique to the United States—a point which is easy enough to substantiate—what is nonetheless remarkable is the manner in which such acts are, in the United States, usually cloaked in the form of enlightenment and altruism, in the form of an aspiration simultaneously toward technological perfection and the pursuit of peace. In a country in which political leaders are held accountable for their decisions by an electorate, violence simply cannot—as it can in totalitarian countries—exist in the raw. Even the most violent acts must be adorned with a benign, rational story. It is in the light of such interlocking relations among war, racism, and knowledge production that I would make the following comments about area studies, the academic establishment that crystallizes the connection between the epistemic targeting of the world and the "humane" practices of peacetime learning. From Atomic Bombs to Area Studies As its name suggests, area studies as a mode of knowledge production is, strictly speaking, military in its origins. Even though the study of the history, languages, and literatures of, for instance, "Far Eastern" cultures existed well before the Second World War (in what Edward W. Said would term the old Orientalist tradition predicated on philology), the systematization of such study under the rubric of special geopolitical areas was largely a postwar and U.S. phenomenon. In H. D. Harootunian's words, "The systematic formation of area studies, principally in major universities, was .. . a massive attempt to relocate the enemy in the new configuration of the Cold War."47 As Bruce Cumings puts it: "It is now fair to say, based on the declassified evidence, that the American state and especially the intelligence elements in it shaped the entire field of postwar area studies, with the clearest and most direct impact on those regions of the world where communism was strongest: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia."48 In the decades after 1945, when the United States competed with the Soviet Union for the power to rule and/or destroy the world, these regions were the ones that required continued, specialized super-vision; to this list we may also add Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As areas to be studied, these regions took on the significance of target fields—fields of information retrieval and dissemination that were necessary for the perpetuation of the United States' political and ideological hegemony. In the final part of his classic Orientalism, Said describes area studies as a continuation of the old European Orientalism with a different pedagogical emphasis: No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and "applies" his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France." Whereas Said draws his examples mainly from Islamic and Middle Eastern area studies, Cumings provides this portrait of the Fast Asian target field: The Association for Asian Studies (AAS) was the first "area" organization in the U.S., founded in 1943 as the Far Eastern Association and reorganized as the AAS in 1956. Before 1945 there had been little attention to and not much funding for such things; but now the idea was to bring contemporary social science theory to bear on the non-Western world, rather than continue to pursue the classic themes of Oriental studies, often examined through philology. . In return for their sufferance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic resources (positions, libraries, language studies)—and soon, a certain degree of separation which came from the social scientists inhabiting institutes of East Asian studies, whereas the Orientalists occupied departments of East Asian languages and cultures. This implicit Faustian bargain sealed the postwar academic deal.50 A largely administrative enterprise, closely tied to policy, the new American Orientalism took over from the old Orientalism attitudes of cultural hostility, among which is, as Said writes, the dogma that "the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by **pacification**, **research and development**, outright **occupation whenever possible**)."" Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the **"scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge** during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the **militaristic con-ception of the world as target**.52 In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are **fully inscribed** in the **politics and ideology of war.** To that extent, the disci-plining, research, and development of so-called academic information are **part and parcel of a strategic logic**. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes"—is it a surprise that it is **doomed to fail** in its avowed **attempts to "know"** the other cultures? Can 'knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is **produced in this self-referential manner**, as a circuit of **targeting** or getting the other that ultimately **consolidates** the omnipotence and omnipresence of **the sovereign "self" / "eye"**—the "I"— that is the United States, the other will have **no choice** but remain just that—**a target** whose existence **justifies only one thing**, **its destruction by the bomber**. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the **self-referential function** of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States **always occupying the position of the bomber**, and other cultures **always viewed as the military and information target fields**. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. "Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to **the silencing of diverse experiences**.54 This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object" —and by "the problem of the vanishing object."55

## 1NR

### Perm

The permutation is a teleological knee jerk which blocks out critique

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

### Kyoto

**No extinction from Ice Age – also defense to oil spills impact**

Easterbrook 3(Gregg, senior fellow at the New Republic, “We're All Gonna Die!”, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set>=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote *Remembrance of Things Past* while lying in bed.

### Space

**The aff is an elaborate expression of the unconconscious fantasies that motivate and sustain pro-space activism---attention to what the 1AC takes for granted reveals that their project is saturated in fantasies of omnipotence and narcissism**

**Ormrod 9** James S. Ormrod, Lecturer in Sociology at Univ. of Brighton, 2009 “Phantasy and Social Movements: An Ontology of Pro-Space Activism”, Social Movement Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 115–129, April 2009

**The centrality of fantasy** or daydreaming **to those pursuing the human exploration, development and settlement of space is well established**. McCurdy (1997) argues that motivation has been based on constructed romantic images of space travel. It is reported that the early rocket pioneers like Robert Goddard were driven by imaginative daydreams. Carl Sagan describes a young Goddard sitting in a cherry tree and envisioning exotic new vehicles (cited in Kilgore, 2003, p. 42). My own interviews showed that pro-space activists continue childhood daydreaming about space in later life, as Melvin, a 35 year-old parttime student from the UK testified; Me: Do you find yourself still daydreaming about space a lot? M: [resounding] Yes. Probably too much, but its one of those things that’s so rigid in my psyche I don’t suppose I’ll ever be able to get it out really. Nor would I want to, I don’t think. Yeah, a lot of people say I spend too much time up there. There were also more subtle clues that vivid space fantasies lay behind individuals’ activism. Middle-aged Bruce McMurray gave the most speculative talks about space settlement at one of the pro-space conferences I attended. What was noticeable about his talks was the authority with which he pronounced not that we could build houses for our space colony in a particular way, but that we will build our houses in a particular way. This was not unique to Bruce but suggested that what he was doing was not forwarding possible solutions to potential engineering problems, but instead describing a very elaborate fantasy he had constructed. Pro-space activists report two main catalysts for their fantasising. The first is reading science fiction. The second is having witnessed previous space missions. Despite crucial differences from science fiction fans (discussed later), science fiction is an essential part of many activists’ paths to joining the movement. One veteran estimated that seventy per cent of members got into the movement through reading (or, less commonly, watching) science fiction. For many of them, the interest in science fiction began at an early age, even as young as four (‘Rupert and the Spaceship’). From this point, activists often developed an insatiable appetite for the genre. Arthur C. Clarke and Robert Heinlein (along with Isaac Asimov and Ray Bradbury) have a particularly close relationship with the pro-space movement. But crucially, pro-space activists did not simply read science fiction passively, they elaborated their own fantasies based on it. The creative aspects of science fiction fandom have been emphasised by Jenkins (1992). When discussing how they ‘got into’ space, nearly all pro-space activists will mention something about their memories of watching space missions, usually huddled around the family TV, or perhaps witnessing a launch in person. Again, childhood memories are the most pertinent. Amongst those I interviewed, first memories ranged from Sputnik I, the first satellite to be put into space in 1957, to the first launch of the American Space Shuttle in 1981. There is a large cohort that grew up during the Apollo era, clearly the most stimulating American space program, but there are many activists inspired by other programs. Journalist Marina Benjamin (2003) explains how NASA’s ‘dream-peddling’ had filled her and others like her with inspiration when they were young, and gave them high hopes for what mankind could achieve in the future. Looking back, she asks reflexively whether these were delusions; ‘Was I naı¨ve to believe we’d simply hop from the moon to other planets and thence to the stars?’ (Benjamin, 2003, p. 3). It is clear that for Benjamin, as for so many pro-space activists, seeing space missions unfold before them had encouraged daydreams and fantasies every bit as much as reading science fiction. **Activists’ fantasies about the future have largely been ignored in social movement research**. This is despite the fact that any utopian movement must, by definition, imagine some form of alternative future society which exists only in the mind and not in reality, as Robin Kelley (2002) has pointed out in his celebration of the imagination in radical social movements. There are many theoretical positions from which fantasy can be approached, however (Ormrod, 2007), and my psychoanalytic framework is quite different to Kelley’s. Where Kelley sees the imagining of future worlds as a positive creative force operating on a conscious level, I argue that **conscious imaginings are best understood as manifestations of underlying unconscious phantasies about the self**. 2 Space Fantasy and Unconscious Phantasy One initial piece of evidence for the unconscious origins of space activists’ motivation is that often they cannot explain why they want to get into space. Jim, a software engineer from Illinois, is articulately inarticulate on the matter 3; Me: For what reasons would you want to go? J: For the fun of it or for the . . . It’s hard to say it’s just been a dreamofmine to be in space, you know. So, why do you want to be in space; it’s exciting, you know, it’s not something that everybody does but still its not trying to beat the Joneses or anything. It’s just one of those desires you grow up with from when you’re a kid, it’s just a strong desire so you kind of loose track of the original reason [ . . . .]. So let me think about that, I might be able to answer you better in the future, but it’s not one of those things . . . It’s sort of like asking somebody ‘why do you scratch your head up here instead of over here?’ It’s like ‘I just got into the habit of doing it’. 118 J. S. Ormrod Jim could no longer remember why it was he wanted to go into space (assuming he ever knew). Lots of other pro-space activists got agitated when pushed on the origins of their selfconfessed ‘drive’.One resorted to saying ‘the mystics amongst us might say God put it there’. My argument is that the conscious fantasies of pro-space activists **play out intrapsychic conflicts and desires relating to the break from the state of primary narcissism experienced in the first few years of life**.4 After reading science fiction or watching space missions, these unconscious phantasies are translated into fantasies about the exploration, development and settlement of space. Two pleasurable aspects of the stage of primary narcissism are relevant here. Arguably the precedent one is the unity of the infant with the mother (‘the monad’, Grunberger, 1989) and indeed the rest of its universe. This is a state in which the infant does not even recognise the separate existence of other selves. Some have suggested this begins with the pre-natal relationship between child and mother in the womb. As the child grows older, it learns to appreciate the independent existence of others (Mahler et al., 1975). The other aspect is the experience of omnipotence - of power and control

over the world - afforded to the infant treated as ‘HisMajesty the baby’ (Freud, 1995, p. 556). This is a world in which all demands are satisfied. In normal development these experiences are, of course, shattered by the realities of family life and social existence. Pro-space activists’ **fantasies can be understood, however, as translations of phantasies about regaining the self of primary narcissism**. I distinguish three dominant themes in pro-space fantasy, though often they occur in combination. The first relates to trips, often just into Earth’s orbit, in which the activist experiences the pleasure of floating around in zero gravity. This weightlessness has been likened to being in the womb (Bainbridge, 1976, p. 255; White, 1987, p. 23). And if sexual partnerships are sought in part as a return to the monad as many psychoanalysts contend, then one activist’s fantasy of having zero-gravity sex perhaps represents the ultimate nirvana. An alternative interpretation is to relate the ease of movement in zero-gravity environments to the way in which at will infants command their parents to pick them up and carry them around. The social and oedipal restrictions that gravity comes to represent are symbolically escaped. A second theme is **the fantasy of seeing the Earth from space as a unified** (and in many accounts insignificant) **whole.** This **demonstrates the activist’s need for separation from the mother coupled with power** over her. Earth is commonly referred to as a ‘mother’, and activists talked about being able to obscure the Earth with their thumb – literally being ‘under the thumb’. But at the same time there is the anticipation of a new feeling of unity with the whole Earth, seen without political boundaries. Indeed in White’s (1987) account of astronauts’ experiences he describes it as ‘the ultimate journey from part to whole’. There is a magical resolution here to the infant’s developmental dilemma. Mother Earth is at once transcended and brought back into one being with the observer. The third theme is present in fantasies about the development and settlement of other planets, the Moon and asteroids. Here **the omnipotent desire to tame, conquer, control and consume the universe is manifest in fantasies** such as playing golf on a course on the moon, mining asteroids or building a colony on Mars (possibly having terraformed the planet – changing its climate to make itmore Earth-like). The envisioning of such distant objects being brought under personal control and symbolically consumed back into the allencompassing self **plays out the desired but impossible regaining of the** phantasized **omnipotent self of primary narcissism** around which the whole universe was oriented.

### Util

Utilitarian problem solving justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians

if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

### Environment

**Securitization undermines cooperation – turns the environment**

**Trombetta 8** (Maria Julia Trombetta, postdoctoral researcher at the department of Economics of Infrastructures, Delft University of Technology; “Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse,” Outh Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 21, Number 4, December 2008)

Opponents were quick to warn that the term 'security' **evokes a set of confrontational practices** associated with the state and the military which **should be kept apart from the environmental debate** (Deudney 1990). Concerns included the possibilities of **creating new competencies for the military—militarizing the environment rather than greening security** (Kakonen 1994)—or the rise of **nationalistic attitudes** in order to protect the national environment (Deudney 1999, 466-468). Deudney argued that not only are practices and institutions associated with national security inadequate to deal with environmental problems, but security can also **introduce a zero-sum rationality** to the environmental debate that can create winners and losers, and **undermine the cooperative efforts** required by environmental problems. Similar objections came from a southern perspective: environmental security was perceived as a discourse about the security of northern countries, their **access to resources** and the **protection of their patterns of consumption** (Shiva 1994; Dalby 1999; Barnett 2001). Although the debate waxed and waned, the concept slowly gained popularity. In April 2007 the security implications of climate change were discussed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council but the state representatives remained divided over the opportunity of considering climate change and, more generally, environmental degradation as a security issue (United Nations Security Council 2007).

The divide between those who oppose the use of the term environmental security by arguing that the logic of security is fixed and inflexible and those who support it by suggesting that the logic of security should be changed distracts attention away from the question of whether practices associated with providing security have been transformed by environmental security discourses. In the literature there is a debate about whether and how **security language transforms the method of dealing with an issue**—the debate focuses 'on the implications of using security language for the definition and governance of migration and the environment' (Huysmans 2006, 16)—but there is little on the reverse process or on the implications of using environmental language for the definition and governance of security. This article is an attempt to develop the latter type of analysis by exploring the meaning and function of environmental and climate security. The purpose is to consider how the use of a word in different contexts challenges and transforms the practices and meanings associated with it. It aims to explore 'what the practices of definition and usage do to a concept, and what the concept in turn does to the world into which it is inscribed' (Bartelson 2000,182). To undertake this analysis it is necessary to explore how different discourses about environmental and climate security have developed and **'conditioned the possibility of thought and action'** (181).

The article is presented in three parts. The first explores why the environment has been excluded from security considerations. By adopting a perspective that is **attentive to the social construction of security issues** and its implications, the article assesses the potential of a **discursive approach in transforming existing security practices**. The analysis draws on the theory of securitization elaborated by the Copenhagen School (inter alia Buzan and Waever 1998) and integrates it with elements borrowed from Beck's work (inter alia 1992, 1999, 2006) on risk society to provide a framework that accounts for transformation. It argues that the securitization of environmental issues can reorient security logics and practices. The second and third parts apply this framework to explore the development of environmental security and climate security discourses respectively.

### Relations

Linearity in IR fails

Bernstein et al 2000 Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber, University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley. “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems” European Journal of International Relations 2000; 6; 43

A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy from theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the 'scientific' quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet **the most relaxed** 'scientific' tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state - war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states - **are close to trivial**, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we were a young science still in the process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is neither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that **the nature, goals and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought**, if theory is to be more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for *predictive* theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its 'hard' and 'soft' versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations.2 We develop the case for forward 'tracking' of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This article is not a nihilistic diatribe against 'modern' conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic, falsifiable hypothesis and large-n statistical 'tests' of narrow propositions. We propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and in a complementary fashion, to 'scientific' theory-testing. *Newtonian Physics: A Misleading Model* Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena - the trajectories of individual planets - can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherendy unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about *trillions* of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often **impossible** to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of **polarity**, relative power and the **balance of power** are among the most widely used independent variables, **but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures** for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be 'tested' decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of **deterrence outcomes**, and about the criteria for **democratic** **governance** and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is **not merely the result of** intellectual anarchy or **sloppiness** - although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, **it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves.** Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on **'idealizations'**, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but **implicit 'theories'** about actors and **contexts that do not exist** (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). **If** problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we **would still find it** difficult, if not **impossible, to construct large enough samples**

of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the **variation across time and the complexity of the interaction** among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory **extraordinarily low**. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.3 Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars - to continue with the same example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. **Even when all the underlying conditions are present**, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. **Wars involve relatively few actors.** Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably **not inherent properties** of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their **potentially random distribution** relative to underlying causes makes it **difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur**. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes **makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult**. **It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic**, since we have **no way of knowing** what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often **impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations**.

Their terrorism advantage is epistemologically suspect---the ballot is crucial to reject state-sponsored knowledge that legitimizes global violence

Raphael 9—IR, Kingston University (Sam, Critical terrorism studies, ed. Richard Jackson, 49-51) ellipses in orig.

Over the past thirty years, a small but politically-significant academic field of ‘terrorism studies’ has emerged from the relatively disparate research efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, and consolidated its position as a viable subset of ‘security studies’ (Reid, 1993: 22; Laqueur, 2003: 141). Despite continuing concerns that the concept of ‘terrorism’, as nothing more than a specific socio-political phenomenon, is not substantial enough to warrant an entire field of study (see Horgan and Boyle, 2008), it is nevertheless possible to identify a core set of scholars writing on the subject who together constitute an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1992: 2–3). That is, there exists a ‘network of knowledge-based experts’ who have ‘recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain’. This community, or ‘network of productive authors’, has operated by establishing research agendas, recruiting new members, securing funding opportunities, sponsoring conferences, maintaining informal contacts, and linking separate research groups (Reid, 1993, 1997). Regardless of the largely academic debate over whether the study of terrorism should constitute an independent field, the existence of a clearly-identifiable research community (with particular individuals at its core) is a social fact.2¶ Further, this community has traditionally had significant influence when it comes to the formulation of government policy, particularly in the United States. It is not the case that the academic field of terrorism studies operates solely in the ivory towers of higher education; as noted in previous studies (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 180; Burnett and Whyte, 2005), it is a community which has intricate and multifaceted links with the structures and agents of state power, most obviously in Washington. Thus, many recognised terrorism experts have either had prior employment with, or major research contracts from, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other key US Government agencies (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989: 142–190; RAND, 2004). Likewise, a high proportion of ‘core experts’ in the field (see below) have been called over the past thirty years to testify in front of Congress on the subject of terrorism (Raphael, forthcoming). Either way, these scholars have fed their ‘knowledge’ straight into the policymaking process in the US.3¶ The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US state means that it is critically important to analyse the research

output from key experts within the community. This is particularly the case because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist assumption, explicitly stated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective (see for example, Hoffman, 1992: 27; Wilkinson, 2003). There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This reification of academic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input:¶ Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the Middle East. . . . It has been the Terrorism Panel’s practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefings. . . . This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions . . .¶ (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added)¶ The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’ and as providing ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ has significance for its contribution to the policymaking process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts tend to insulate the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because ‘they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship’ that expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77).¶ Given this, it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b; Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of research is important, given that the ‘threat’ from this form of terrorism has led the US and its allies to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound consequences for the human security of people in the region.¶ Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field’s research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply replicate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to insulate from critique those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly ‘silence’ the way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions in the South. That is, ‘counterterrorism’ campaigns executed or supported by Washington often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 18–19).¶ These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of ‘objectivity’. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various ‘war(s) on terror’. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US state.